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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Writing of American law in 1955, Professor Charles Wright was able 
to say, with obvious disappointment, that “there is no law of remedies.”1 
What Professor Wright was lamenting was the absence of any treatment 
in American law, particularly in the literature, of the law of remedies as 
a whole.  As he put it: “The votary of this obscure science must pursue 
 
 *  Professor and Dean of Law, Flinders University, South Australia.  **  Commissioner, New South Wales Law Reform Commission; Professorial Fellow, the University of Melbourne.  1. Charles Alan Wright, The Law of Remedies as a Social Institution, 18 U. DET. L.J. 376, 376 (1955). 
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his researches through separate books and digest topics on Damages, 
Equity, Specific Performance, Injunction, Quasi-Contracts, Rescission, 
Declaratory Judgments, Restitution, and perhaps others.”2  If the question 
had occurred to an Australian legal scholar at the time, he or she would 
have written something similar.  But, the Australian scholar would, we 
suspect, have added two observations.  The first would have been that 
the position in Australian law was the same as that in English law.  The 
second, not necessarily consistent with the first, would have been that, of 
the specific topics listed by Professor Wright, the ones that attracted 
most attention in Australia were those that involved equitable remedies.  
After all, damages was largely a jury question that barely raised any 
general issues beyond “remoteness” and the measure of recovery in 
specific instances.3 And restitution lay hidden in the forms of action 
from which it seldom emerged.4 
Professor Wright’s landscape changed, at least marginally, in 
Australia in the second half of the twentieth century.  Both observations 
of our hypothetical mid-century legal scholar are relevant to that change, 
and both continue to have their effect on the development of the 
common law of Australia. 
II.  THE EMERGENCE OF AN AUSTRALIAN LAW OF REMEDIES 
A.  The Emergence of an Independent Australian Law 
British sovereignty over Australia dates from 1788.  Notwithstanding 
the mutual dependence of legal and social development that we now take 
for granted,5 there was a tendency, persisting well into the twentieth 
century, to stress the desirability of maintaining the uniformity of the 
common law in all those jurisdictions in which it applied in the British 
Empire.  Thus, in 1879 in the heyday of empire, the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council in England, on appeal from a decision of the 
 
 2. Id.  3. This is readily apparent from Mayne on Damages, the standard English text, first published in 1856, and is true of all editions before the twelfth, which was written by Dr. Harvey McGregor.  See HARVEY MCGREGOR, MAYNE AND MCGREGOR ON DAMAGES (12th ed. 1961); see also THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE 
OF DAMAGES OR AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES WHICH GOVERN THE AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION RECOVERED IN SUITS AT LAW, Chs. I–III (1847) (stating that general issues in damages relate only to compensation, nominal damages, remoteness, and consequential damages).  4. For the movement from quasi-contract to restitution in Australian law, see KEITH MASON & J.W. CARTER, RESTITUTION LAW IN AUSTRALIA 4–34 (1995).  See 
generally Justice Keith Mason, Where Has Australian Restitution Law Got To and 
Where is it Going?, 77 AUSTL. L.J. 358 (2003).  5. Especially since FREDERICK CHARLES VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE 24–31 (Abraham Hayward trans., 2d ed. 1828). 
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Supreme Court of New South Wales, said: “[I]t is of the utmost 
importance that in all parts of the empire where English law prevails, the 
interpretation of that law by the Courts should be as nearly as possible 
the same.”6  Some sixty years later, the High Court of Australia, which 
by virtue of Chapter III of the Australian Constitution (which came into 
force in 1901) then stood together with the Privy Council at the apex of 
the Australian court system, applied this principle to prefer a decision of 
the House of Lords to one of its own previous decisions, simply because 
the Australian decision was inconsistent with the English decision.7 
From 1968, appeals to the Privy Council from Australian courts were 
progressively abolished:8 in 1968, in all matters having a “federal 
element”;9 in 1975, in all appeals from the High Court to the Privy 
Council;10 and, in 1986 from any court in Australia.11  This had the 
effect of freeing the High Court from the shackles of English precedent.  
As early as December 1986, the Court stated that, with the abolition of 
Privy Council appeals, no court in Australia was technically bound by 
decisions of English courts.  The Court said: 
The history of this country and of the common law makes it inevitable and desirable that the courts of this country will continue to obtain assistance and guidance from the learning and reasoning of United Kingdom courts just as Australian courts benefit from the learning and reasoning of other great common law courts. . . .  [T]he precedents of other legal systems are not binding and are useful only to the degree of the persuasiveness of their reasoning.12 
In truth, this formal relegation of English precedent to the status of 
“foreign” represented what had been happening in practice for some 
 
 6. Trimble v. Hill, [1880] 5 App. Cas. 342, 345 (P.C. 1879) (appeal taken from N.S.W.).  More modern manifestations of this view are sometimes found.  For example, in Cassell & Co. v. Broome, [1972] A.C. 1027, 1083 (H.L.), Lord Hailsham hoped (in vain) that, after the decision in the instant case, Commonwealth courts would reconsider their opposition to Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129 (H.L.).  7. Piro v. W. Foster & Co. (1943) 68 C.L.R. 313, 320 (Austl.); see also Ford v. Ford (1947) 73 C.L.R. 524, 528 (Austl.).  8. For an exhaustive account of the issues surrounding the topic of Privy Council appeals from Australia, see generally A.R. Blackshield, The Abolition of Privy Council 
Appeals: Judicial Responsibility and “The Law for Australia”, ADEL. L. REV. 1 (1978).  9. Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act 1968–1973, 1973, § 3 (Austl.).  10. Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act, 1975, § 3 (Austl.).  11. Australia Act, 1986, § 11 (Austl.).  12. Cook v. Cook (1986) 162 C.L.R. 376, 390 (Austl.). The Court left open the binding nature of decisions of the House of Lords during the period when appeals lay to the Privy Council. 
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years.13  The High Court had never been completely subservient to the 
Privy Council and conflict did occur between the two courts.14  This 
occurred principally (but not exclusively) in constitutional cases, where 
the High Court, determined to develop a distinct constitutional 
jurisprudence which borrowed liberally from the United States and 
Canada, quickly asserted its authority over the Privy Council which, 
with its limited experience of dealing with written constitutions, 
appeared inept.15  By 1967, it was clear that the Privy Council had 
“bowed out of the mainstream of Australian constitutional law by 
adopting a course the practical wisdom [i.e. of simply following 
decisions of the High Court of Australia] of which was, from another 
perspective, but a confirmation of its total inability to make an 
independent contribution to [Australian constitutional jurisprudence].”16 
Beyond constitutional matters, disquiet with developments in English 
law began to emerge in the second half of the twentieth century.  Parker 
v. The Queen17 in 1963 became the first occasion of open dissent.  The 
case concerned manslaughter and the object of the High Court’s 
displeasure was the decision of the House of Lords in Director of Public 
Prosecutions v. Smith,18 which was not strictly relevant to the actual 
decision in Parker, but which was in conflict with previous High Court 
decisions in so far as it restated aspects of the test for provocation in 
objective terms, rather than in the subjective terms favored by the High 
Court.  The point was, thus, a fundamental one: defining moral 
blameworthiness for the purposes of the criminal law.  The Court went 
out of its way to say that, at least in this instance, the decision of the 
House of Lords should not be followed.  Sir Owen Dixon, often regarded 
as the greatest of Australia’s Chief Justices, wrote: 
 
 
 13. A point made by Sir Anthony Mason when he was sworn in as Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia.  See 162 C.L.R. at x. 
 14. See DAVID B. SWINFEN, IMPERIAL APPEAL: THE DEBATE ON THE APPEAL TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL, 1833–1986, at 161–64 (1987).  15. For some contemporary and trenchant criticisms of the Privy Council’s role in Australian constitutional (and other) law, see F.R. Beasley, Appeals to the Judicial 
Committee: The Case for Abolition, 7 RES JUDICATAE 399, 409–11 (1957); J.G. Latham, 
Book Reviews, 1 MELB. U. L. REV. 266, 270 (1958) (reviewing GEOFFREY SAWER, CASES 
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (2d ed. 1957) and W. ANSTEY WYNES, LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL POWERS IN AUSTRALIA (2d ed. 1956)). 
 16. See MICHAEL COPER, FREEDOM OF INTERSTATE TRADE UNDER THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 168 (1983) (the quotation has been generalized at the end, the original limiting the point to the jurisprudence associated with § 92 of the Constitution).  17. (1963) 111 C.L.R. 610 (Austl.), rev’d, (1964) 111 C.L.R. 665 (P.C.).  18. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Smith, [1961] A.C. 290 (H.L. 1960).  The decision was reversed in England by the Criminal Justice Act, 1967, c. 80, § 8 (Eng.). 
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Hitherto I have thought that we ought to follow decisions of the House of Lords, at the expense of our own opinions and cases decided here, but having carefully studied Smith’s Case I think that we cannot adhere to that view or policy.  There are propositions laid down in the judgment which I believe to be misconceived and wrong.  They are fundamental and they are propositions which I could never bring myself to accept. . . .  I wish there to be no misunderstanding on the subject.  I shall not depart from the law on the matter as we had long since laid it down in this Court and I think that Smith’s Case should not be used as authority in Australia at all.19 
His Honor (whose judgment was a dissenting one) added that all the 
other members of the High Court concurred in this view.20 
Beyond the criminal law, Parker held out the possibility that 
Australian courts were no longer automatically bound to follow English 
decisions that they regarded as wrong.  The test came early, in defining 
the boundaries of that unique common law remedy, exemplary damages.  
Historically, the common law has attached a great deal of importance to 
the protection of some rights—ranging from rights to personal security 
to the right to vote.  An interference with these rights is actionable per se 
without proof of loss.21  Where the defendant interfered with such rights 
intentionally, as by trespassing on the plaintiff’s property, the courts, 
from at least the seventeenth century, would consider whether the 
plaintiff ought to recover damages by way punishment of the defendant.  
The focus was on the conduct of the defendant to determine if it was, in 
the circumstances, so high-handed or obnoxious as to require punishment 
and deterrence.  The conduct must, in the somewhat archaic English 
used in Australia, and derived from Salmond on Torts,22 amount to 
“conscious wrongdoing in contumelious disregard of another’s rights.”23 
There are many difficulties with such a remedy, not the least of which 
are that it confuses the purposes of the criminal and civil laws24 and that 
it purports to punish the defendant without the safeguards of the criminal 
law—such as the presumption of innocence and the requirement that the 
 
 19. Parker 111 C.L.R. at 632 (footnotes omitted). 
 20. Id. at 635.  21. For a list of such torts, see CLERK & LINDSELL ON TORTS 65–66 (R.W.M. Dias et al. eds., 15th ed. 1982). 
 22. See 1 M.J. TILBURY, CIVIL REMEDIES para.  5004 (1990).  23. Whitfeld v. De Lauret & Co. (1920) 29 C.L.R. 71, 77 (Austl.); Gray v. Motor Accident Comm’n (1998) 196 C.L.R. 1, 7 (Austl.). 
 24. Cf. Gray 196 C.L.R. at 6–8 (drawing attention, respectively, to the historical mingling of tort and crime and to the fact that there is not necessarily a sharp cleavage between the civil and criminal law). 
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defendant’s guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt.25  In addition 
to these difficulties of principle, there were two other problems with the 
remedy.  First, the cases did not clearly articulate the circumstances in 
which the remedy was available: was it available only in certain types of 
actions, such as torts actionable per se or in all actions in which the 
defendant’s conduct was sufficiently egregious?  Second, the cases in 
which these sorts of damages had been awarded did not really specify 
exactly what the purpose of the damages were: were they really aimed at 
punishment or at giving the plaintiff greater compensation because the 
plaintiff had (presumptively or otherwise) suffered greater loss than he 
or she would have done if the defendant had not acted so egregiously? 
In 1964, the House of Lords attempted to clarify the law in Rookes v. 
Barnard.26  In a part of his speech with which all the other members of 
the House concurred, Lord Devlin held that, in the future, exemplary 
damages should only be awarded in three cases:27 (1) “[O]ppressive, 
arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the servants of the government”; 
(2) Where “the defendant’s conduct has been calculated by him to make 
a profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation payable to 
the plaintiff”; and (3) Where such damages are authorized by statute. 
The decision was extremely controversial.  In England, the Court of 
Appeal, led by Lord Denning, M.R., held, on specious grounds, that the 
decision had been delivered per incuriam.28  An inevitable appeal 
followed to the House of Lords which reaffirmed Rookes v. Barnard 
and, not so gently, chastised the Court of Appeal for its disobedience.29  
In Australia, the High Court was more direct.  In Uren v. John Fairfax & 
Sons Pty. Ltd.30 in 1966, the Court held that Lord Devlin’s categories 
were neither justified by precedent nor compelling in logic.  Leaving 
aside the third category (exemplary damages authorized by statute), the 
latter point must readily be conceded: 
 If one takes the first category, why should it only be the 
exercise of power by servants of the government?  What 
about an oppressive exercise of power by a large corporation? 
 If one takes the second category, why exemplary damages?  
Surely, if at all, this should be an action in restitution? 
 
 25. The classical exposition of these concerns is Cassell & Co. v. Broome, [1972] A.C. 1027, 1087 (H.L.) (opinion of Lord Reid).  See also Harris v. Digital Pulse Pty. Ltd. (2003) 56 N.S.W.L.R. 298, 386–91.  26. [1964] A.C. 1129 (H.L.). 
 27. Id. at 1226–27.  28. Broome v. Cassell & Co., [1971] 2 Q.B. 354, 382 (C.A.). 
 29. Cassell, [1972] A.C. at 1075–76.  30. Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty. Ltd. (1966) 117 C.L.R. 118 (Austl.), aff’d 
sub nom. Austl. Consol. Press Ltd. v. Uren, [1969] 1 A.C. 590, 615 (P.C. 1967). 
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The inevitable appeal then possible from the High Court to the Privy 
Council saw the Privy Council agreeing with the High Court.31  
Delivering the Board’s advice, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest said: 
The issue that faced the High Court in the present case was whether the law as it had been settled in Australia should be changed.  Had the law developed by processes of faulty reasoning, or had it been founded upon misconceptions, it would have been necessary to change it. Such was not the case.  In the result in a sphere of the law where its policy calls for decision, and where its policy in a particular country is fashioned so largely by judicial opinion, it became a question for the High Court to decide whether the decision in Rookes v. Barnard compelled a change in what was a well-settled judicial approach in the law of libel in Australia.  Their Lordships are not prepared to say that the High Court were wrong in being unconvinced that a changed approach in Australia was desirable.32 
As far as exemplary damages are concerned, the Uren decision meant 
that, unlike English law, the development of the law relating to 
exemplary damages could, theoretically at least, proceed on a principled 
basis by reference to its rationale.  Thus, in Gray v. Motor Accident 
Commission33 the High Court held that, even where the defendant’s 
conduct is punishable in principle, it will not support a claim for 
exemplary damages to the extent to which the defendant has already 
been subjected to substantial criminal punishment in respect of that very 
conduct.34  The award no longer has any function.  Linking their availability 
to their rationale has the effect of ensuring that exemplary damages are 
only recoverable in Australian law in exceptional circumstances,35 just 
as the “three-categories approach” does in English law. 
In contrast to the Australian approach, an English court must 
determine at the outset whether the case falls within one of Lord 
Devlin’s three categories.36  And until recently, it also had to determine 
if the case fell within one of the causes of action for which exemplary 
damages were available before Rookes v. Barnard (on the basis that 
Rookes v. Barnard did not intend to widen the categories of cases in 
which exemplary damages could be recovered).37  On that approach, 
 
 31. Austl. Consol. Press Ltd. v. Uren (1967) 117 C.L.R. 221 (P.C). 
 32. Id. at 241 (footnote omitted).  33. (1998) 196 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.). 
 34. Id. at 13–14. 
 35. Id. at 9. 
 36. See Kuddus v. Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary, [2002] 2 A.C. 122 (H.L. 2001). 
 37. See A.B. v. S.W. Water Servs. Ltd., [1993] Q.B. 507 (Eng. C.A. 1992), 
overruled by Kuddus, [2002] 2 A.C. at 122. 
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exemplary damages would probably not be relevant in a negligence 
claim.  Yet in Australian law, it is clear that exemplary damages are 
available where a claim lies in negligence because even a negligent 
defendant can behave consciously in contumelious disregard of the 
plaintiff’s rights—as, for example, where an employer, more or less 
aware of the risks, negligently exposes employees to the risk of 
contracting asbestosis by reason of exposure to asbestos over many 
years.38  But there is a limit: exemplary damages are probably not available 
in Australia where the case is exclusively equitable, simply because 
equity and penalty are strangers.39  This is one reason why the principled 
development of equitable damages held out in Uren remains theoretical 
only. 
B.  The Emergence of an Independent Australian Law of Remedies 
As with exemplary damages, so with other nominate remedies, there 
were developments with a distinctly Australian flavor in the second half 
of the twentieth century.  Beyond exemplary damages, the Uren case 
itself was important for the development of the law of damages 
generally.40  This is because the High Court there accepted the distinction 
that Lord Devlin, in Rookes v. Barnard,41 had found between aggravated 
damages (intended to compensate) and exemplary damages (intended to 
punish and deter).  This held out the promise of a principled development of 
the compensation principle itself.  That promise has largely been fulfilled.42  
Further, the law of restitution continues to develop in Australia, although 
any broad acceptance of the doctrine of unjust enrichment as a basis of 
liability, as advocated by many restitution scholars,43 is unlikely, at least 
at the point at which the doctrine would subsume the traditional 
doctrines of equity.44  At one level, this reflects a skepticism that a basis 
of liability should be outcome-based, rather than focused more squarely 
on the conduct of the defendant.45  At another level, it reflects the 
 
 38. For a review of the more recent cases, see Michael Tilbury, Exemplary 
Damages in Negligence Claims, 5 TORT L. REV. 85 (1997); Michael Tilbury, Exemplary 
Damages in Medical Negligence, 4 TORT L. REV. 167 (1996).  39. Harris v. Digital Pulse Pty. Ltd. (2003) 56 N.S.W.L.R. 298, 298.  40. Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty. Ltd. (1966) 117 C.L.R. 118 (Austl.), aff’d 
sub nom. Austl. Consol. Press Ltd. v. Uren, [1969] 1 A.C. 590, 615 (P.C. 1967).  41. [1964] A.C. 1129, 1221 (H.L.). 
 42. See infra Part III.  43. Most influential in this scholarship is that inspired by Peter Birks.  See 
generally PETER BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (1985).  44. Consider, especially, the important analysis of unjust enrichment theory in 
Roxborough v. Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd. (2001) 208 C.L.R. 516, 543–45 (Austl.) (opinion of Gummow, J.). 
 45. See Paul Finn, Equitable Doctrine and Discretion in Remedies, in RESTITUTION: 
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continuing vitality in Australia of equity as a separate body of doctrine.  
It is at this point that the second observation of our hypothetical mid-
century legal scholar becomes relevant.  The development of the nominate 
remedies in Australian law in the second half of the twentieth century 
continued to reflect the importance of the separate development of law 
and equity.46 
There were two factors compelling this separate development.  The 
first is, essentially, the power and intellectual influence of the “equity 
bar” in New South Wales,47 in practice the most important jurisdiction in 
Australia.  New South Wales only completely adopted a judicature system 
in 1972,48 so that it had the experience of the separate administration of 
law and equity for almost a century after “fusion” in England.  That 
period was marked by the flowering of equity scholarship at Sydney 
University Law School, under the influence first of Sir Frederick 
Jordan49 and subsequently of Meagher, Gummow, and Lehane,50 of 
whose treatise on equity Justice Heydon (a Justice of the High Court of 
Australia) has said that “no greater legal work has been written by 
Australians.”51  The second factor was that contract cases litigated as far 
as the High Court tended, until the last twenty years or so of the last 
century, to involve contracts relating to the sale of land, rather than 
commercial contracts.  And it is, of course, in the context of such contracts 
that the equitable remedy of specific performance flourishes. 
The consideration of that remedy in Australian courts in the second 
half of the twentieth century continued to stress its inherently discretionary 
nature.  The High Court had laid the foundations of the law of specific 
performance in the first half of the century, making it clear that equitable 
remedies would not be granted where their effect would allow the 
 
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 251 (W.R. Cornish et al. eds., 1998). 
 46. See infra Part IV. 
 47. See Harris v. Digital Pulse Pty. Ltd. (2003) 53 N.S.W.L.R. 298, 305–06. 
 48. See Supreme Court Act, 1970 (N.S.W.); see also Law Reform (Law and Equity) Act, 1972 (N.S.W.).  49. Jordan’s Chapters on Equity in New South Wales were the notes from which generations of students at Sydney Law School learned their “Equity.”  They are reprinted in SIR FREDERICK JORDAN, SELECT LEGAL PAPERS (6th ed. 1983). 
 50. See R.P. MEAGHER ET AL., EQUITY: DOCTRINES AND REMEDIES (1975).  The work is now in its fourth edition, released in 2002.  51. J.D. Heydon, The Role of the Equity Bar in the Judicature Era, in NO MERE MOUTHPIECE: SERVANTS OF ALL, YET OF NONE 71, 81 (Geoff Lindsay & Carol Webster eds., 2002). 
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plaintiff to take advantage of unconscionable conduct52 or would subject 
the defendant or relevant third parties to an unconscionable hardship53—the 
conduct or hardship in question outweighing all other discretionary 
considerations operating in the case.  In the second half of the century, 
this venerable body of jurisprudence continued, and continues to be 
applied on a daily basis in Australian courts, for example, to deny 
equitable remedies against particularly vulnerable defendants, especially 
where the plaintiff had in some way taken advantage of the situation.54  The importance of this is that the exercise of equitable discretion has 
never become completely rule-based in Australia.  In Patrick Stevedores 
Operations No. 2 Pty. Ltd. v. Maritime Union of Australia,55 a majority 
of the High Court cited with approval Vice Chancellor Sir Richard 
Kindersley’s classical approach to the exercise of equitable discretion: 
[W]henever a Court of Equity is asked for an injunction in cases of such a nature as this, it must have regard not only to the dry strict rights of the Plaintiff and Defendant, but also to the surrounding circumstances, to the rights or interests of other persons which may be more or less involved: it must, I say, have regard to those circumstances before it exercises its jurisdiction (which is unquestionably a strong one) of granting an injunction.56 
A current illustration is the “constant supervision” consideration.  
Traditionally, courts of equity refused to grant specific performance 
where its grant would require the constant supervision of the court.  In 
nineteenth century English case law this tended to provide a conclusive 
defense to an action for specific performance.57  One manifestation was 
the “settled practice” of the courts in refusing specific performance of a 
contract to carry on a business, except in exceptional circumstances.58  
Although the English House of Lords has recently attempted to restate 
 
 52. See, e.g., Summers v. Cocks (1927) 40 C.L.R. 321 (Austl.); cf. Slee v. Warke (1949) 86 C.L.R. 271 (Austl.) (stating that the defendant’s unilateral mistake, to which the plaintiff did not contribute, did not prevent the grant of a discretionary remedy). 
 53. See, e.g., Dowsett v. Reid (1912) 15 C.L.R. 695, 705–07 (Austl.); Gall v. Mitchell (1924) 35 C.L.R. 222 (Austl.); cf. Patrick Stevedores Operations No. 2 Pty. Ltd. v. Mar. Union (1998) 195 C.L.R. 1, 41–43 (Austl.) (granting an injunction against a defendant in an industrial dispute notwithstanding the potential hardship to a third party by reason of the likely nonperformance of a contract between the defendant and the third party as a result of granting the injunction, in circumstances where the third party was aware of the industrial dispute at the time of entering into the contract with the defendant). 
 54. See Blomley v. Ryan (1956) 99 C.L.R. 362, 399–401 (Austl.). 
 55. Patrick Stevedores Operations 195 C.L.R. at 41.  56. Wood v. Sutcliffe, 61 Eng. Rep. 303, 304 (V.C. 1851). 
 57. See Ryan v. Mut. Tontine Westminster Chambers Ass’n, [1893] 1 Ch. 116; see 
also J.C. Williamson Ltd. v. Lukey and Mulholland (1931) 45 C.L.R. 282, 297–98 (Austl.) (opinion of Dixon, J.). 
 58. See, e.g., Braddon Towers Ltd. v. Int’l Stores Ltd. [1987] 1 E.G.L.R. 209, 213 (Ch. 1979). 
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the “settled practice” in traditional terms,59 which have been approved 
by the High Court,60 it is likely that the restatement is too rigid for the 
purposes of Australian law and fails to allow sufficient room for the 
operation of the discretionary considerations involved.61  Thus, there is 
little doubt that specific performance will, in appropriate cases, be 
ordered against an anchor tenant of a shopping centre who threatens, in 
breach of contract, to close its business causing potential loss to other 
tenants of the shopping centre.62 
The separate or independent development of equitable remedies is also 
illustrated by the development of the “Mareva injunction” in Australian 
law.  Invented by the English Court of Appeal in 1975,63 a Mareva prevents 
a defendant before judgment from parting with property, its object being 
to prevent the frustration the court’s processes.  Its existence flies in the 
face of classical authority in the law of injunctions that “[y]ou cannot get 
an injunction to restrain a man who is alleged to be debtor from parting 
with his property.”64  As such, its acceptance in Australian law was always 
going to be problematic.  At the same time, the need for it was felt in a 
number of areas of law.  A compromise was found: an order restraining 
a party to litigation from parting with property before judgment can be 
made in appropriate cases, but not as part of the law of injunctions.65  
The order is rather an asset preservation order founded in the inherent 
jurisdiction of the court to prevent the frustration of its processes, 
particularly at the interlocutory level.66  Classifying the order in this way 
 
 59. Coop. Ins. Soc’y Ltd. v. Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd., [1998] A.C. 1, 2 (H.L. 1997). 
 60. Patrick Stevedores Operations, 195 C.L.R. at 46–47. 
 61. See I.C.F. SPRY, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITABLE REMEDIES app. C (6th ed. 2001). 
 62. See Diagnostic X-Ray Servs. Pty. Ltd. v. Jewel Food Stores Pty. Ltd. (2001) 4 V.R. 632.  63. The Mareva takes its name from Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. Int’l 
Bulkcarriers S.A., [1980] 1 All E.R. 213 (C.A. 1975), although the first instance of such an injunction was Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis, [1975] 3 All E.R. 282, 283 (C.A.).  64. Robinson v. Pickering, [1881] 16 Ch. 660, 661 (opinion of James, L.J.); see 
also Lister & Co. v. Stubbs, [1890] 45 Ch. 1, 13. 
 65. See Cardile v. LED Builders Pty. Ltd. (1999) 198 C.L.R. 380, 380–81 (Austl.).  Compare the approach of the U.S. Supreme Court in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, 
S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318–21, 330–31 (1999) (granting a 
Mareva-type order would involve the creation of an equitable remedy inconsistent with the equitable powers conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789 and would otherwise interfere with the fundamental balance of debtor and creditor law). 
 66. See also Austl. Broad. Corp. v. Lenah Game Meats Pty. Ltd. (2001) 208 
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not only preserves the integrity of the traditional law of injunctions—and 
hence of equity as a separate body of doctrine—but also provides the 
basis for the principled development of the order in question. 
The developments that we have outlined are, of course, no more than 
developments in nominate remedies.  It remains true that there is no 
consideration of the law of remedies as such in the authoritative sources 
of Australian law.67  However, there is increasing treatment of remedies 
as a legal subject in its own right in law schools across Australia.  This, 
in turn, has generated an academic literature with texts68 and casebooks69 
devoted to the subject.  It is too early to say what the effect will be on 
the authoritative sources of the law, but this may form one of the leit-
motifs of the twenty-first century.70 
III.  THE GENERAL TRIUMPH OF THE COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE 
A very significant development in Australian law in the second half of 
the twentieth century—a development that will have a profound effect 
on the future development of the law of remedies—is the clear 
emergence of compensation not only as the governing principle of the 
law of damages (and hence as the most important objective of the law of 
remedies as a whole), but also as the express goal of civil liability.71  
While Oliver Wendell Holmes had found the “general purpose” of tort 
law in compensation as early as 1881,72 it was not until 1966 that Justice 
Windeyer declared in Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty. Ltd. that 
“[c]ompensation is the dominant remedy if not the purpose of the law of 
torts today,”73 a statement capable of applying to the law of contract if 
its purpose is seen as satisfying the expectations of the party entitled to 
performance.74  Compensation restores the status quo in tort and protects 
the expectation interest in contract.  It thus reflects, and is indeed 
 
C.L.R. 199, 243 (Austl.) (opinion of Gummow and Hayne, J.J.).  67. On the importance of this, see infra Part VI.  68. Texts devoted exclusively to remedies are: WAYNE COVELL & KEITH LUPTON, PRINCIPLES OF REMEDIES (2d ed. 2003); BRUCE KERCHER & MICHAEL NOONE, REMEDIES (2d ed. 1990); 1–2 M.J. TILBURY, CIVIL REMEDIES (1990 & 1993).  There are, of course, also texts on the individual remedies. 
 69. See ANNE COSSINS, REMEDIES IN CONTEXT: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS (2003); MICHAEL TILBURY ET AL., REMEDIES: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2004). 
 70. See infra Part VI.  71. This section draws on Michael Tilbury, Reconstructing Damages, 27 MELB. U. L. REV. 697, 708–11 (2003). 
 72. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 115 (Mark De Wolfe Howe ed., 1963).  73. Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty. Ltd. (1966) 117 C.L.R. 118, 149 (Austl.), 
aff’d sub nom. Austl. Consol. Press Ltd. v. Uren, [1969] 1 A.C. 590, 615 (P.C. 1967). 
 74. See Coop. Ins. Soc’y Ltd. v. Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd., [1998] A.C. 1, 15 (H.L. 1997) (opinion of Lord Hoffman). 
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commensurate with, the underlying rationale of these bodies of the law. 
There are many examples of the restatement and refinement of the 
compensation principle in the law of damages in Australia in the second 
half of the twentieth century.  The acceptance, in Uren’s case, of Lord 
Devlin’s distinction between aggravated (compensatory) damages and 
exemplary (punitive) damages, is undoubtedly the high watermark.75  
Some other important examples are: 
 First, some cases have abandoned general formulae in 
common use in the assessment of damages in particular 
types of cases in favor of a measure that, in the 
circumstances, more accurately gives effect to the 
principle of compensation.76  Thus, in Butler v. Egg & Egg 
Pulp Marketing Board,77 the High Court subordinated the 
general measure of damages in conversion (the full value 
of the goods)78 to the general principle of compensation in 
circumstances where the facts would have resulted in 
over-compensation by application of the conventional 
measure. 
 Second, the compensation principle has driven the clear 
trend towards the deductibility of collateral benefits in the 
assessment of damages.79 
 Third, the decision of the High Court in Cullen v. 
Trappell80 held that, in accordance with the compensation 
principle, personal injury plaintiffs are only entitled to 
recover after-tax earnings in awards for lost earning 
capacity because they cannot have “lost” what they would 
never have “received.” 
 
 75. See supra Part II.B. 
 76. See generally S.M. Waddams, The Principles of Compensation, in ESSAYS ON DAMAGES 1 (P.D. Finn ed., 1992).  77. Butler v. Egg & Egg Pulp Mktg. Bd. (1966) 114 C.L.R. 185 (Austl.). 
 78. Id. at 190.  79. HAROLD LUNTZ, ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH 428–30 (4th ed. 2002); see also LAW COMM’N, DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY: MEDICAL, NURSING AND OTHER EXPENSES; COLLATERAL BENEFITS § 10.4–.8 (1999) (starting point is deductibility).  80. Cullen v. Trappel (1980) 146 C.L.R. 1, 30–32 (Austl.) (overruling Atlas Tiles Ltd. v. Briers (1978) 144 C.L.R. 202 (Austl.)). 
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 Fourth, the decision of the High Court in Commonwealth 
of Australia v. Amann Aviation81 clearly establishes that a 
plaintiff is only entitled to claim “reliance loss” in an 
action for breach of contract to the extent to which the 
plaintiff can show (presumptively or otherwise) that such 
loss would have been recouped with the result that it 
cannot exceed the expectation interest. 
 Fifth, the decision of the High Court in Hungerfords v. 
Walker,82 overruling a long-standing principle that damages 
are not recoverable for the late payment of money,83 held 
that compensation (in the form of interest) is recoverable 
by plaintiffs who have suffered loss by reason of being 
deprived or kept out of their damages. 
These examples of the development of the law of damages by analysis 
and refinement of the principle of compensation only became possible in 
the latter half of the twentieth century with the virtual disappearance of 
the jury in civil proceedings.  While juries still played a role in such 
proceedings, it was possible to say that damages were “an arcanum of 
the jury box into which judges hesitated to peer.”84  The disappearance 
of juries led, at first, to a restatement that the assessment of damages 
involved a “broadbrush” exercise looking at the overall award in a 
global sense and juxtaposing it to the injury in question.85  But the 
assessment of damages soon took on a more scientific appearance in all 
branches of the law.86  For example, future economic loss was (and is) 
computed in personal injury cases using mathematical or actuarial tables.  
And it is now clear that a broadbrush approach to the assessment of 
future economic loss is no longer acceptable, either generally87 or in 
relation to specific items of economic damage.88 
 
 81. Australia v. Amann Aviation Pty. Ltd. (1991) 174 C.L.R. 64, 104–05 (Austl.); 
see also McRae v. Commonwealth Disposals Comm’n (1951) 84 C.L.R. 377 (Austl.).  82. Hungerfords v. Walker (1989) 171 C.L.R. 125 (Austl.). 
 83. See London, Chatham & Dover Ry. Co. v. S. E. Ry. Co., [1893] A.C. 429 (H.L.).  84. Cassell & Co. v. Broome, [1972] A.C. 1027, 1125 (H.L.).  85. The high watermark is the decision of the High Court in Arthur Robinson 
(Grafton) Ltd. v. Carter (1968) 122 C.L.R. 649, 655 (Austl.) (discussing economic loss in a personal injury case).  86. For personal injury, the turning point was the approach in Sharman v. Evans (1977) 138 C.L.R. 563 (Austl.). 
 87. See Rosstown Holding Pty. Ltd. v. Mallinson (2000) 2 V.R. 299, 309–10 (C.A.). 
 88. See Nolan v. Hamersley Iron Pty. Ltd. (2000) 23 W.A.R. 287 (discussing loss of superannuation benefits). 
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IV.  THE RESURGENCE OF EQUITABLE COMPENSATION 
When we slide over to the equity side of the historical divide we find 
that, although its role is less dominant than at common law, a firm place 
for the compensation principle emerged in the late stages of the twentieth 
century.  The relevant equitable remedy is usually called, simply, “equitable 
compensation.”  It has been described as “a developing area of law,” its 
remedial vigor “of comparatively recent vintage.”89  But it can hardly be surprising that equity, in its inherent jurisdiction, would develop a 
compensatory remedy to deal with losses arising from breaches of 
equitable obligations.90 
And there is no doubt that we must regard the remedy as one 
underpinned by the compensation objective.  This is so notwithstanding 
a propensity among judges to use the term “restitution” to describe the 
purpose of equitable compensation.91  But it is restitution in the sense of 
restoration to a previous position, not in the more modern sense of unjust 
enrichment.  One of the benefits of the resurgence of the remedy is a 
wider recognition that its “object . . . is to restore persons who have 
suffered loss to the position in which they would have been if there had 
been no breach of the equitable obligation.”92 
The resurgence came in two stages.  Its genesis is the “great speech”93 
of Lord Haldane, L.C., in Nocton v. Lord Ashburton.94  Previously, equitable compensation’s “core territory”95 was the simple personal duty 
of an express trustee to account for lost trust assets.  But in Nocton, the 
House of Lords extended the remedy to apply against a solicitor who, 
conflicted in interest, advised his client to discharge certain mortgage 
securities.  This left the client without adequate security when the loan 
 
 89. Beach Petroleum NL v. Kennedy (1999) 48 N.S.W.L.R. 1, 90.  90. Indeed, to some extent, the jurisdiction is long-established, grounded in the old Bill of Chancery to enforce compensation for breach of fiduciary duty.  See Nocton v. Lord Ashburton, [1914] A.C. 932, 946 (H.L.); see also Joshua Getzler, Equitable 
Compensation and the Regulation of Fiduciary Relationships, in 1 RESTITUTION AND EQUITY 235, 235–36 (Peter Birks & Francis Rose eds., 2000); PETER M. MCDERMOTT, EQUITABLE DAMAGES Ch. 1 (1994).  91. For a good example of such usage, see the influential decision of Justice Street in Re Dawson [1966] 2 N.S.W.R. 211, 214–16.  92. O’Halloran v. R.T. Thomas & Family Pty. Ltd. (1998) 45 N.S.W.L.R. 262, 272 (opinion of Spigelman, C.J.).  93. R.P. MEAGHER ET AL., MEAGHER, GUMMOW & LEHANE’S EQUITY: DOCTRINES 
AND REMEDIES 831 (4th ed. 2002). 
 94. Nocton, [1914] A.C. at 943–58.  95. Getzler, supra note 90, at 236. 
DAVIS-TILBURY.DOC 8/21/2019  2:10 PM 
 
1726 
went bad.  There was not here any dissipation of any part of a trust 
estate.  Rather, the client was worse off following the breach of fiduciary 
duty, and the House of Lords held the solicitor liable to compensate for 
that loss: “The proper mode of giving relief might have been to order 
Mr. Nocton to restore to the mortgage security what he had procured to 
be taken out of it, in addition to making good the amount of interest lost 
by what he did.”96 
Despite this vulnerability of fiduciaries to liability for loss generally, 
the remedy lay largely (although not entirely) dormant.97  But, with the 
“energetic development of the reach of equitable duties”98 (even with 
Australian courts resisting the temptation seen elsewhere to expand the 
notion of fiduciary obligations),99 the latter stages of the twentieth 
century saw a burgeoning of equitable compensation cases.  In many 
instances this may have involved litigants, by way of asserting the 
existence of equitable obligations, seeking to escape limitation period 
defenses that would have applied had their actions been grounded in tort 
or contract.100  However, the logic was perhaps inescapable—breach of 
an obligation, loss, the triumph of the compensatory objective, Nocton v. 
Lord Ashburton—and equitable compensation became quickly 
established as a “vital part of [the] judicial armoury” of all the major 
Commonwealth jurisdictions.101 
And what powerful armory it can be.  In one case, where a fraudulent 
joint venturer induced the other joint venture party to part with its 
interest to an incoming participant, the judicial analysis of the alternative 
legal outcomes was that damages for deceit would amount to $250,000 
whereas equitable compensation (for breach of the fiduciary obligations 
that one joint venturer owes to another) came to $23 million—a 
difference (after allowing for the award of interest) of some $35 
million.102  The case, rather dramatically, raises a key issue.  We have 
 
 96. Nocton, [1914] A.C. at 958. 
 97. See, e.g., McKenzie v. McDonald [1927] V.L.R. 134, 146 (1926).  The highly influential case of Re Dawson [1966] 2 N.S.W.R 211 involved a defaulting custodial fiduciary who improperly caused to be paid away foreign currency trust funds; by the time of the trial these were worth considerably more in Australian terms and the fiduciary’s liability was to compensate at the later value.  As Rickett has recently reminded us, this scenario is in fact akin to the dissipating trustee being required to restore the trust estate.  Charles E. F. Rickett, Equitable Compensation: Towards a 
Blueprint?, 25 SYDNEY L. REV. 31, 38 (2003) [hereinafter Rickett, Blueprint].  98. Rickett, Blueprint, supra note 97, at 31. 
 99. See Pilmer v. Duke Group Ltd. (in Liquidation) (2001) 207 C.L.R. 165, 196–97 (Austl.); Maguire v. Makaronis (1997) 188 C.L.R. 449, 474 (Austl.). 
 100. See the discussion in Getzler, supra note 90, at 246–48.  101. Charles Rickett, Compensating for Loss in Equity—Choosing the Right Horse 
for Each Course, in 1 RESTITUTION AND EQUITY, supra note 90, at 173 [hereinafter Rickett, Right Horse].  102. Biala Pty. Ltd. v. Mallina Holdings Ltd. (1993) 13 W.A.R. 11, aff’d sub nom. 
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identified above the triumph of the compensation principle in the law of 
damages.  How do we justify two103 such remedies in the one legal 
system?104 
Within Australia (and elsewhere),105 this issue has played itself out in 
the context of two related questions.  First, to what extent, if at all, ought 
an award of equitable compensation be subject to limiting factors such as, or 
akin to, causation, remoteness, mitigation, contributory negligence, etc.?  
Second, are factors such as these applicable simply by analogy to the 
common law or by the flexibility inherent in the nature of an equitable 
remedy? 
The matter has proved at its most challenging in respect of causation.  
In the context of a brief section such as this one, present purposes can be 
served if we limit our discussion to this factor.106  Although causation 
must, in justice, always be a limitation on the recovery of compensation 
in equity,107 courts have struggled to reconcile that undoubted truth with 
the implications derived from the decision of the Privy Council in 
Brickenden v. London Loan & Savings Co.108  A solicitor breached his 
fiduciary duty by failing to disclose to his client his personal interest in 
elements of a loan transaction arranged between the plaintiff and another 
client, which transaction turned out badly for the plaintiff.  It was argued 
 
Dempster v. Mallina Holdings Ltd. (1994) 13 W.A.R. 124; see also Jeff Berryman, Some 
Observations on the Application of Equitable Compensation in WA: Dempster v. Mallina Holdings Ltd., 25 U. W. AUSTL. L. REV. 317, 319–22 (1995); Wayne S. Martin, 
Principles of Equitable Compensation, in CIVIL REMEDIES: ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS 114, 135–38 (Robyn Carroll ed., 1996).  103. In fact the number is three, when one takes into account so-called equitable (or 
Lord Cairns Act) damages, i.e. statutory damages originally authorized to be awarded by the Court of Chancery in England pursuant to the Chancery Amendment Act, 1858, 21 & 22 Vict., c. 27 (Eng.), a jurisdiction that still survives in Australia.  See, e.g., Supreme Court Act, 1970, § 68 (N.S.W.), and corresponding provisions in other states and territories.  See generally MCDERMOTT, supra note 90 (providing a full treatment of the remedy); Michael Tilbury & Gary Davis, Equitable Compensation, in THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 797, 826–39 (Patrick Parkinson ed., 2d ed. 2003).  104. Michael Tilbury, Teaching Remedies in Australia, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 587, 592 (2001). 
 105. See, e.g., Canson Enters. v. Boughton & Co., [1991] 85 D.L.R. 4th 129 (Can.); Target Holdings Ltd. v. Redferns, [1996] A.C. 421 (H.L. 1995); Bank of N.Z. v. N.Z. Guardian Trust Co. [1999] 1 N.Z.L.R. 664.  106. At this point, we draw upon our Chapter 22 in Parkinson’s THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY.  See generally Tilbury & Davis, supra note 103. 
 107. Target Holdings, [1996] A.C. at 432; see also Anthony Mason, The Place of 
Equity and Equitable Remedies in the Contemporary Common Law World, 110 L.Q. REV. 238, 244 (1994).  108. [1934] 3 D.L.R. 465 (Can.) (opinion of Lord Thankerton). 
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against the plaintiff in the claim for compensation that there was no 
evidence that the plaintiff had not received full value in the transaction 
and that the plaintiff would have been no worse off even if full 
disclosure had been made by the solicitor.  The “rule of Brickenden”109 
is contained in the following remarks: 
 When a party, holding a fiduciary relationship, commits a breach of his duty by non-disclosure of material facts, which his constituent is entitled to know in connection with the transaction, he cannot be heard to maintain that disclosure would not have altered the decision to proceed with the transaction, because the constituent’s action would be solely determined by some other factor, such as the valuation by another party of the property proposed to be mortgaged.  Once the Court has determined that the non-disclosed facts were material, speculation as to what course the constituent, on disclosure, would have taken is not relevant.110 
Read strictly, the test “seems to render it unnecessary even to inquire 
whether the loss would have occurred had there been no breach of 
duty . . . .”111  Counsel have, on occasion, submitted as much.112  Viewed 
in these absolute terms, Brickenden has the capacity to “present the 
spectre . . . that fiduciaries will be unfairly burdened with consequences 
that have no logical connection with their breach.”113   
But it seems clear now in Australia that this cannot be the correct 
interpretation of Brickenden.  The High Court114 has recently approved 
Lord Justice Mummery’s pithy way of putting it: “[t]here is no equitable 
by-pass of the need to establish causation.”115  To answer the first question 
(as it is relevant to causation), equitable compensation as a remedy must 
certainly pass over a hurdle called “causation.”116   
This leaves a subsidiary question involving the nature of the causation 
requirement for equitable compensation.  Does it, for example, incorporate 
elements of policy and values in the manner of Australian common 
 
 109. See Maguire v. Makaronis (1997) 188 C.L.R. 449, 492 (Austl.). 
 110. Brickenden, [1934] 3 D.L.R. at 469.  111. Charles Lo Presti Pty. Ltd. v. Karabalios [2000] N.S.W.S.C. 395 (15 May 2000) at [26] (Austin, J.), at http://www.Austlii.edu/au/au/cases/nsw/supreme_ct/2000/ 395.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
 112. See, e.g., Beach Petroleum NL v. Kennedy (1999) 48 N.S.W.L.R. 1, 91 (“[I]n the case of causation for purposes of determining equitable compensation, authority ‘forbids speculation as to what might have occurred if not for the breach of fiduciary duty.’”). 
 113. Maguire 188 C.L.R. at 494 (opinion of Kirby, J., although his Honor’s analysis led him to reject that spectre).  See generally J.D. Heydon, Causal Relationships 
Between a Fiduciary’s Default and the Principal’s Loss, 110 L.Q.  REV. 328 (1994).  114. Youyang Pty. Ltd. v. Minter Ellison Morris Fletcher (2003) 196 A.L.R. 484, 492 (Gleeson, C.J., McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, and Hayne, J.J.).  115. Swindle v. Harrison, [1997] 4 All E.R. 705, 733 (C.A.).  116. However, it would seem otherwise for remoteness, mitigation, contributory negligence, etc.  See Tilbury & Davis, supra note 103, at 819–22. 
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law?117  Does it permit courts to decline to find a causal link when, on 
the balance of probabilities, a view is taken as to what would have 
happened had there been no breach of equitable obligation?118 
What can be discerned in Australian case law is what one commentor 
calls (although not with specific reference to Australian law) a “very 
plaintiff-friendly”119 attitude.  Causation is dealt with by application of 
the full benefit of hindsight.120  This leads to an acceptance of the notion 
that, on account of differing causation analyses, a plaintiff may recover 
more in compensation in equity than might be recoverable at common 
law on the same facts.121  The Australian cases strongly suggest that the 
analysis in equity is one of “but for,” that is, “the inquiry [is] whether the 
loss would have happened if there had been no breach.”122 
However, some recent analyses, both judicial123 and academic,124 try 
to avoid a monolithic approach to the problem.  Equitable obligations are 
nowadays too diverse.  The causation requirement must accommodate the 
diversity and adjust to fit the circumstances.  It is therefore suggested 
that, where the equitable duty, for example of skill and care, resembles a 
common law duty, common law rules, not only of causation but also of 
remoteness, measure, etc., should apply by analogy.  A modern and 
united legal system demands such coherence. 
 
 117. This “common sense” approach oriented around whether liability should be attributed to a contract-breaker or tortfeasor is supported by numerous cases at the High Court level, of which March v. E. & M. H. Stramare Pty. Ltd. (1991) 171 C.L.R. 506, 514 (Austl.), and Chappel v. Hart (1998) 195 C.L.R. 232, 238 (Austl.), are perhaps the best known; the most recent exposition is contained in Justice Hayne’s judgment in 
Pledge v. Roads and Traffic Authority (2004) 205 A.L.R. 56, 58–61. 
 118. See, e.g., Beach Petroleum NL v. Kennedy (1999) 48 N.S.W.L.R. 1, 93–94; Gilbert v. Shanahan [1998] 3 N.Z.L.R. 528, 535–36; Maguire 188 C.L.R. at 493.  119. Rickett, Right Horse, supra note 101, at 176.  120. O’Halloran v. R T Thomas & Family Pty. Ltd. (1998) 45 N.S.W.L.R. 262, 273; Permanent Bldg. Soc’y (in Liquidation) v. Wheeler (1994) 11 W.A.R. 187, 235 (Ipp, J.).  121. Pilmer v. Duke Group Ltd. (in Liquidation) (2001) 207 C.L.R. 165, 225–26 (Austl.) (“[D]iffering approaches of equity and the common law to assessing the consequences of the wrong, and to whom that wrong is properly attributed.”); McCann v. Switz. Ins. Austl. Ltd. (2000) 203 C.L.R. 579, 621–22 (Austl.). 
 122. Re Dawson [1966] 2 N.S.W.R. 211, 215 (Street, J.); see also Pilmer 207 C.L.R. at 227; McCann 203 C.L.R. at 588, 621–22; Maguire 188 C.L.R. at 491–94; 
O’Halloran 45 N.S.W.L.R. at 275, 277. 
 123. See, e.g., Bank of N.Z. v. N.Z. Guardian Trust Co. [1999] 1 N.Z.L.R. 664; Bristol & W. Bldg. Soc’y v. Mothew, [1998] Ch. 1, 19 (C.A. 1996). 
 124. See generally Rickett, Blueprint, supra note 97. 
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Possibly so, but the High Court of Australia remains unconvinced, as 
evidenced by these very recent (albeit obiter) remarks from its judgment 
in Youyang Pty Ltd. v Minter Ellison: 
[T]here must be a real question whether the unique foundation and goals of equity, which has the institution of the trust at its heart, warrant any assimilation even in this limited way with the measure of compensatory damages in tort and contract.  It may be thought strange to decide that the precept that trustees are to be kept by courts of equity up to their duty has an application limited to the observance by trustees of some only of their duties to beneficiaries in dealing with trust funds.125 
While the Court endorsed the notion that in questions of causation one 
must focus on the relevant equitable duty,126 one remains driven, judging 
by these remarks, to the view that if equitable compensation is to be 
limited, the limitations will arise from the nature and needs of equity 
itself.127 
The resurgence of equitable compensation has forced us to confront, 
in something that goes beyond the comfortable confines of history, the 
place of modern equity in a judicature system that is now 130 years old. 
Professor Rickett, characteristically, has put the point with utter clarity: 
[I]n the end, the debate about equitable compensation . . . is actually a debate about the make-up of modern equity, and the latter’s place in the civil law of obligations and property in the new century.  The blueprint for equitable compensation is a particular application of the greater blueprint for modern equity.128 
The passage extracted above from Youyang offers a solid signal to what 
is not on that blueprint so far as Australia is concerned—the common 
law.  As Justice Kirby has put it, the High Court has repeatedly recognized 
that “in Australia, the substantive rules of equity have retained their 
identity as part of a separate and coherent body of principles.”129 
V.   THE STATUTORY OVERLAY OF THE COMMON LAW 
It would be difficult to overstate the impact that legislation has had on 
the development of Australian remedial law.  Two developments will be 
discussed as contrasting illustrations, one promoting the compensation 
 
 125. Youyang Pty. Ltd. v. Minter Ellison Morris Fletcher (2003) 212 C.L.R. 484, 500 (Austl.) (Gleeson, C.J., McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, and Hayne, J.J.). 
 126. Id. at 502 (endorsing Swindle v. Harrison, [1997] 4 All E.R. 705, 734 (C.A.).  127. This was the view of McLachlin, J., in Canson Enterprises v. Boughton & Co., (1991) 85 D.L.R. 4th 129, 154 (Can.), a view that has largely been endorsed by Australian judges, most recently in Youyang itself.  Youyang 212 C.L.R. at 500.  128. Rickett, Blueprint, supra note 97, at 32.  129. Pilmer v. Duke Group Ltd. (in Liquidation) (2001) 207 C.L.R. 165, 231 (Austl.). 
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objective, the other undercutting it.  However, it would be remiss to 
write about statutes without mentioning what is probably the single most 
dominant one, in practical terms, operating in Australia. 
That statute is the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (along with its State 
and Territory counterparts in the form of fair trading legislation).130  This 
Act, especially Part V and even more especially the prohibition in 
section 52 of “conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to 
mislead or deceive,” has revolutionized commercial and consumer 
litigation in Australia: “[T]he ‘luxuriant and proliferating growth in 
actions upon s 52 or upon its State counterparts’ has quite overshadowed 
the general law.”131  The remedies provided for contravention are wide-
ranging and broadly interpreted to promote the competition, consumer 
protection, and fair trading objects of the Act.132  In respect of the 
damages or compensation remedies in particular, provided by sections 
82 and 87, the High Court, after a tentative start,133 has adopted an 
approach that eschews any presumption that the Act’s remedial 
provisions are to be interpreted either by analogy to the common law or 
with the common law as a starting point.134  Any doubt about that 
proposition has been removed by the High Court’s recent emphatic 
reminder in rare (for that Court) unanimous joint reasons of the entire 
bench.135  As we have seen with equitable compensation, Australian 
remedial law sections off its various source components. 
Returning to our primary illustrations, the first sees statute as a 
mechanism for reinforcing the dominance of the compensation principle.  
As is well known, the common law denied damages entirely to persons 
who failed to care adequately for their own safety, notwithstanding 
otherwise actionable want of care on the part of a tortfeasor.136  Justice 
McHugh has recently remarked upon this situation, and its consequences: 
 
 130. The Fair Trading Act, 1985 (Vict.), was the first of these to be enacted, with other jurisdictions following over the ensuing five years.  131. PETER HEFFEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 483 (2002) (quoting Prestia v. Aknar (1996) 40 N.S.W.L.R. 165, 181).  132. Henville v. Walker (2001) 206 C.L.R. 459, 489 (Austl.). 
 133. See Gates v. City Mut. Life Assurance Soc’y Ltd. (1986) 160 C.L.R. 1, 6 (Austl.). 
 134. See I & L Sec. Pty. Ltd. v. HTW Valuers (Brisbane) Pty. Ltd. (2002) 210 C.L.R. 109, 135 (Austl.); Henville 206 C.L.R. at 470; Marks v. GIO Austl. Holdings Ltd. (1998) 196 C.L.R. 494, 495 (Austl.).  135. Murphy v. Overton Invs. Pty. Ltd. (2004) 204 A.L.R. 26, 27, 37.  136. Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809). 
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 Until the middle of the twentieth century, the contributory negligence of a plaintiff was a defence to an action for negligence, even if the negligence of the defendant far outweighed the contributory negligence of the plaintiff.  No one with experience of common law jury trials could fail to believe that juries often—perhaps usually—avoided the harshness of the rule by taking a benign view of the plaintiff’s conduct.  On some occasions, juries even appeared to compromise by reducing the plaintiff’s damages to accord roughly with his or her responsibility for the damage suffered.137 
His Honor went on to relate, again something well known, the various 
correctives that judges, having come to dislike the harshness of the rule, 
developed in order to weaken that harshness.138 
All of these common law developments, with the possible exception 
of the tendency of juries to lessen damages in a rough and ready sense, 
worked against the compensation principle.  The denial of damages to 
victims of negligence negates the compensation principle, obviously.  
But so did the correctives, because in an all-or-nothing environment, an 
avoidance of contributory negligence findings allowed plaintiffs to 
recover full compensation notwithstanding that they were, to some 
extent, the authors of their own misfortunes.  The common law of 
contributory negligence also had a distorting effect on the principles of 
causation, as explained by Chief Justice Mason in March v. E. & M. H. 
Stramare Pty. Ltd.,139 and to that extent, a potential adverse impact on 
the achievement of the compensation objective.  This changed with 
development of a legislative mechanism for apportionment of the damages 
as between a negligent defendant and a contributorily negligent plaintiff.  
The latter half of the twentieth century saw all Australian jurisdictions 
enact legislation modeled upon the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) 
Act 1945 (UK).140  Courts were given the power to apportion liability for 
loss according to the plaintiff’s and defendant’s share of responsibility.  
A wide discretion was conferred upon a court to reduce the damages 
recoverable “to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having 
regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage.”141 
 
 137. Josyln v. Berryman (2003) 198 A.L.R. 137, 142. 
 138. Id. at 142–43.  These correctives included a shifting of the onus of proof to the defendant to establish contributory negligence, the development of the “last opportunity” rule, the practical excision of contributory negligence from employment cases, and the doctrine that contributory negligence was not a defence to actions for breach of statutory duty.  139. (1991) 171 C.L.R. 506, 511–14 (Austl.).  140. Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c. 28 (Eng.).  141. Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1965, § 10(1) (N.S.W.); see also corresponding provisions in other states and territories. 
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Whether the common law itself eventually would have developed its 
own apportionment principles,142 the legislative solution clearly hastened 
the arrival of a situation that, in the circumstances, best achieved rightful 
compensation for victims of negligence.  And this role for statute 
remains true.  In Astley v. Austrust Ltd.,143 the High Court ruled that the 
apportionment legislation did not apply to claims made in contract, even 
in respect of breach of a contractual obligation of care that was parallel 
to and concurrent with a tortious duty.  Plaintiffs fortunate enough to be 
able to found their claims on the common law of contract would obtain 
full damages, notwithstanding a proved failure on their parts to take care 
for their own interests.144  Australian legislatures quickly responded to 
restore the primacy of the compensation principle.145 
It has been quite the opposite in our second example of the statutory 
impact on the law of remedies.  We have already addressed146 the fact that 
in the field of recovery of damages for personal injuries, as elsewhere, 
the trend of common law damages assessment took on more and more of 
a scientific appearance in the second half of the last century than had 
previously been the case.  The approach adopted was to identify as precisely 
as possible the losses and harms, so that they could be compensated 
adequately.  Making due allowance for the impact of taxation, collateral 
benefits and so forth both added to the science of the approach and 
promoted the achievement of the ultimate objective. 
However, as illustrated in the following discussion, much of this has 
been undermined by legislative developments of the past quarter century 
or so.  The inexorable trend emanating from the legislatures has been to 
diminish the payouts to plaintiffs, leaving them undercompensated.  
Ironically, this grew out of legislative developments whose object was to 
ensure that the largest classes of injured plaintiffs actually received their 
compensatory payments, in the sense of ensuring that they did not 
remain vulnerable to judgment-proof defendants. 
 
 142. See the discussions in Gary Davis & Jane Knowler, Down But Not Out: 
Contributory Negligence, Contract, Statute and Common Law, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 795, 812–15 (1999) and Geoff Masel & David Kelly, Contributory Negligence and the 
Provision of Services: A Critique of Astley, 74 AUSTL. L.J. 306, 316–23 (2000).  143. (1999) 197 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.).  144. Full recovery arose because, unlike in tort, contributory negligence had never been a defense to breach of contract actions. 
 145. See, e.g., Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act, 2001, § 3 (S. Austl.), defining fault to mean, inter alia, “a breach of a contractual duty of care.”  Other formulae are found in the legislation of other states and territories. 
 146. See supra Part III. 
DAVIS-TILBURY.DOC 8/21/2019  2:10 PM 
 
1734 
The field of transport accidents constitutes a leading example.  That is, 
the concern is manifested in the issue of how to deal with the 
consequences of the “death of, or bodily injury to, any person caused by 
or arising out of the use of [a motor] vehicle . . . .”147  Legislation of this 
nature created a scheme of compulsory third party (CTP) insurance, 
typically with the insurer being a publicly funded body.148  The legislation 
would provide for a prescribed policy of insurance to be issued, with the 
CTP insurer being made liable to indemnify the persons specified in the 
policy.149  However, the legislation would typically go beyond the 
provision of mere indemnity rights and obligations as between insured 
and CTP insurer and give a successful plaintiff direct recourse to the 
CTP insurer without the need to go through the usual enforcement 
processes against the negligent defendant.150  This reinforced the legislative 
policy of assuring that injured persons’ rights to compensation would 
not be defeated by a defendant’s lack of assets.151 
But the compensation principle eventually foundered upon the rock of 
politics or of, perhaps more charitably, sound public sector cost control 
measures.  As common law damages awards started to escalate into the 
millions of dollars, with even lesser claims involving considerable 
transaction costs, the CTP insurance schemes became underfunded.  
Premiums rose substantially in consequence.  With these being levied as 
part of the process for collection of motor vehicle registration charges 
and with, it should be recalled, the CTP insurer typically being a public 
statutory body, the popular perception was that governments were 
answerable for these increases in premiums.  There was political capital 
in keeping premiums from rising, or at least from rising too often or too 
steeply.  Accordingly, most Australian jurisdictions took legislative steps to 
restrict the damages payable to victims of motor vehicle accidents.  
There were several variations on the theme: floors and ceilings on recovery 
of damages might be imposed, availability of certain heads of damage 
might be curtailed or abolished, statutory formulae for the calculation of 
damages might be adopted, and the like.  But the theme itself was clear 
enough. 
Lately, the movement away from compensation has increased markedly.  
No longer are the legislatures merely responding to the apparent needs 
of publicly funded statutory insurers in certain spheres of activity.  
 
 147. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Act, 1959, § 104 (S.A.). 
 148. See, e.g., Motor Accident Commission Act, 1992, §§ 4, 14 (S.A.). 
 149. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Act, § 107 (S.A.). 
 150. Id. § 112. 
 151. See JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 441–42 (9th ed. 1998); see also Baskerville v. Martin (1967) S.A. St. R. 156, 157–58; Gassner v. Frost (1940) S.A. St. R. 295, 298. 
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Following the collapse of an aggressive discounter in the insurance 
market, and aided by media report after media report of either large 
premium increases or the cancellation of popular local attractions and 
events due to either the unaffordability of insurance premiums or the 
denial of coverage, the private insurers have been able to convince 
governments of a public liability insurance crisis in full bloom.152  The 
legislative response has been towards nationally consistent and 
comprehensive tort reform.153  This followed the recommendations of 
the Ipp Committee, headed by the Honorable Justice David Ipp of the 
New South Wales Court of Appeal, which reported on comprehensive 
reforms to the law of negligence designed to reduce the cost of injury 
claims and, as a consequence, the cost of insurance.154 
Developments in the second half of the twentieth century mean that, in 
relation to personal injury claims in Australia, the compensation 
principle has not triumphed.  A couple of letters have been lost, and it 
has instead been trumped—by affordability.  That this is the case is 
conspicuously driven home through the realization that the Ipp 
Committee was established, not by the law officers of the executive 
branches of governments in Australia, but by the Commonwealth 
Minister for Revenue and Assistant Treasurer, with the concurrence of 
State and Territory Treasurers.155 
 
 152. See, e.g., the official Report (at 1) accompanying the introduction into the South Australian legislature of the Law Reform (Ipp Recommendations) Bill 2003: “This Bill represents the second stage of the Government’s legislative response to the crisis in the cost and availability of insurance.” See the legislative record: South Australia, 
Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 3 April 2003, 2700 (K. O. Foley, Deputy Premier). 
 153. See, e.g., Civil Liability Amendment (Personal Responsibility) Bill, 2002 (N.S.W.).  154. LAW OF NEGLIGENCE REVIEW PANEL, Review of the Law of Negligence Report (2002).  155. Further in this regard, note the opening to the Ipp Committee’s Terms of Reference:    The award of damages for personal injury has become unaffordable and unsustainable as the principal source of compensation for those injured through the fault of another.  It is desirable to examine a method for the reform of the common law with the objective of limiting liability and quantum of damages arising from personal injury and death. 
Id. at ix.  Note also the second Term of Reference: “Develop and evaluate principled options to limit liability and quantum of awards for damages.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
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VI.  ISSUES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
The importance of viewing the law of remedies as a whole, rather than 
as a series of disparate nominate responses, is that it focuses attention on 
two inexorably connected issues, namely, the relationship between right 
and remedy; and the factors that affect remedial choice.  Both of these 
issues are fundamental to the future development of the law of remedies.  
They raise, in particular, the question of the extent to which liability and 
remedy involve congruent rights (the “monist view”) or ought to be 
subject to separate consideration and determination (the “dualist view”).156  
And, if the latter, the extent to which choice of remedy belongs to the 
plaintiff or to the court.  These are difficult questions, whose answers will 
have to address many powerful considerations along the way, including 
that of “discretionary remedialism.”157  The degree to which the courts 
become involved in the determination of these issues in the twenty-first 
century depends, in no small measure, on the extent to which today’s 
law students come to appreciate the importance of an awareness of the 
law of remedies as a whole. 
We have no doubt that most Australian law students will graduate 
with a sound understanding of nominate remedies that recognizes the 
need to articulate clearly the policies and objectives underlying each 
remedy, while bearing in mind the necessity for doctrinal “fit.”158  They 
will thus be well prepared to address, for example, the issue that must, 
inevitably, be faced in Australia about whether, in view of the dominance of 
compensation in the civil law, exemplary damages ought to have a place 
in our legal system at all,159 and, if so, exactly what that place should be.  
 
 156. See generally Kit Barker, Rescuing Remedialism in Unjust Enrichment Law: 
Why Remedies are Right, 57 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 301 (1998); Peter Birks, Rights, Wrongs, 
and Remedies, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000); Grant Hammond, Rethinking 
Remedies: The Changing Conception of the Relationship Between Legal and Equitable 
Remedies, in REMEDIES: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES Ch. 4 (Jeffrey Berryman ed., 1991); Grant Hammond, The Place of Damages in the Scheme of Remedies, in ESSAYS ON DAMAGES Ch. 9 (P.D. Finn ed., 1992); Michael Tilbury, Remedies and the Classification 
of Obligations, in THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: CONNECTIONS AND BOUNDARIES Ch. 2 (Andrew Roberston ed., 2004); Justice Thomas, An Endorsement of a More Flexible Law 
of Civil Remedies, 7 WAIKATO L. REV. 23 (1999); Donovan W.M. Waters, Liability and 
Remedy: An Adjustable Relationship, 64 SASK. L. REV. 429 (2001). 
 157. See Peter Birks, Three Kinds of Objection to Discretionary Remedialism, 29 U. W. AUSTL. L. REV. 1 (2000) (arguing that allowing courts a strong discretion in remedy selection destabilizes the rule of law); cf. Simon Evans, Defending Discretionary 
Remedialism, 23 SYDNEY L. REV. 463 (2001) (arguing that the discretion in remedy selection is circumscribed and necessary).  158. On which, see especially Harris v. Digital Pulse Pty. Ltd. (2003) 56 N.S.W.L.R. 298, 335–39 (Mason, P., dissenting).  159. The High Court acknowledges this in Gray v. Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 C.L.R. 1, 10, 33 (Austl.); see also Kuddus v. Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary, [2002] 2 A.C. 122, 134–35 (H.L. 2001) (opinion of Lord 
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This necessitates at least an analysis of the underlying rationale of 
exemplary damages.  But an understanding and appreciation of that rationale 
may not be enough.  To articulate the basis of exemplary damages in 
terms of punishment or deterrence is one thing.160  But to include within 
the purpose of exemplary damages the assuagement of the urge for 
revenge and the discouragement of self-help161 is to envisage a remedy 
whose purpose is more indeterminate.  The more so if those purposes 
then come to be articulated as “deterrence, vindication, condemnation, 
education, the avoidance of the abuses of . . . power, appeasement of the 
victim and the symbolic impact of a decision as an expression of 
society’s disapproval of certain conduct.”162 
To define a remedy in such wide terms begs the question of its 
relationship to other remedies.  It demonstrates the need for a holistic 
approach to remedies.  As does the isolation of legal and equitable remedies.  
To take the example of exemplary damages once again: can we really 
support a rule that denies exemplary damages simply on the basis that 
the plaintiff’s claim is in equity?163  The result is purportedly justified by appealing to the notion that “equity and penalty are strangers.”164  But why is the common law any different?  Indeed, is not the result the 
wrong way around?  After all, the common law remedy of damages is 
imbued with the notion of compensation (not punishment) and compensation 
is the governing purpose of remedies in most legal systems.165  Equitable 
money remedies have only recently embraced the concept as such.166  
Traditionally, they are gain-based.  And gain-based remedies, with their 
 
Slynn); id. at 137–38 (opinion of Lord Mackay); cf. the opinions of Lord Hutton, id. at 146–49, and Lord Scott, id. at 155–57. 
 160. See, e.g., Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty. Ltd. (1966) 117 C.L.R. 118, 150 (Austl.), aff’d sub nom. Austl. Consol. Press Ltd. v. Uren, [1969] 1 A.C. 590, 615 (P.C. 1967). 
 161. See Lamb v. Cotogno (1987) 164 C.L.R. 1, 9 (Austl.).  162. Bottrill v. A. [2001] 3 N.Z.L.R. 622, 648 (C.A.) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  In a powerful decision, the majority of the New Zealand Court of Appeal restricted the rationale of exemplary damages to punishment, but they were overruled by the Privy Council who saw that purpose as including “an emphatic vindication of the plaintiff’s rights.”  A. v. Bottrill, [2003] 1 A.C. 449, 457 (P.C. 2002); cf. id. at 466 (Lords Hutton and Millett, dissenting).  163. Consider Harris 56 N.S.W.L.R. at 298.  164. The expression comes from the judgment of Justice Somers in Aquaculture 
Corp. v. New Zealand Green Mussel Co. [1990] 3 N.Z.L.R. 299, 302. 
 165. See Hans Stoll, Consequence of Liability: Remedies, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW (TORTS) [8-1] (André Tunc ed., 1983). 
 166. See supra Part IV. 
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allowances for defendants and their awards of interest focused on the 
nature of the defendant’s conduct, look far more punitive than 
compensatory ones.167  The truth is that the question of the extent to 
which punitive monetary remedies are available in our law cannot 
sensibly be answered without regard to the whole fabric of legal, 
equitable, and statutory remedies.168 
So viewed, the task of lawyers in the twenty-first century will be to 
ensure the continued principled development not only of the law 
surrounding individual remedies, but also the law of remedies as a 
whole.  In this century, we must surely take seriously Professor Wright’s 
censure of the absence of a law of remedies.169 
 
 
 167. Cf. Harris 56 N.S.W.L.R. at 365–84 (arguing that these factors do not disclose a punitive element in equitable monetary relief).  168. There is a hint of recognition of this in Gray v. Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 C.L.R. 1, 7–8 (Austl.). 
 169. See supra note 1. 
